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Why Academics should have a duty of truth telling? 
 
Abstract  
 
In this article, I advocate that university education has at its core a mission to enable 
its communities of scholars (staff and students) to make judgements on what can be 
trusted, and that they, themselves, should be truth-tellers. It is about society being 
able to rely upon academic statements, avoiding deliberate falsehoods. This requires 
trust in oneself to make those judgements; an obligation to do so; and the courage to 
speak out when such judgements might be unpopular, risky or potentially unsafe. I 
suggest it should be a duty placed on academics to be truth-tellers and to educate 
potentially gullible others in what it is to have worthy and reliable self-trust in their 
own judgements. 
 
Introduction 
Trust has attracted the attention of higher education scholars in a number of forms and for 
a number of purposes. The discussion is, for the most part, about systems, organisations and 
accountabilities which are the basis, of higher education’s public trust, a trust resulting from 
a reasoned expectation that involves both confidence and reliance that these educational 
institutions are ‘acting responsibly and for the common good’ (Bird, 2013: 25). It is certainly 
important that organisational trust is facilitated but this article concerns the need for 
academics themselves to be sincere in their actions in higher education. It goes further and 
argues that the scholars and faculty have an obligation to their students, to their colleagues 
and to society which transcends that of the institution of higher education, albeit 
contributing to it. It seeks to argue that academics and students have a duty to tell the truth 
even when it is unpopular, risky or potentially unsafe for them. In so doing, duty becomes 
the core of the spirit of the university, not the pragmatism of the current neo-liberal agenda. 
The need to reaffirm such a commitment is appropriate at a time when political 
authority and the media pronounce negatively about UK vice-chancellors’ pay and the 
tuition fee system, and threats of government interference in European Studies curricula, 
capping student numbers if fees continue to rise. How can a university administration speak 
out against powerful others using the ascribed authority of the Government when, I suggest, 
they become compliant with government non-academic interventions in many respects? 
The responsibility I want to claim is on the individual academic to speak out, risking much, 
to hold the university and those who control it to account for the consequences of it actions. 
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The Rationale 
This is important according to Jameson for, in the current era of marketization, there is a 
‘loss of trust’ (2012: 411) in UK universities, manifest in government rhetoric and its 
agencies of quality control. This is not a new observation. As early as 1992, Bok was 
seeking ways in which US universities could go about restoring public trust. Ten years later, 
O’Neill wrote of ‘crises of trust’ (2002: 45) and, after another decade, Collini made reference 
to an ‘erosion of trust’ (2012: 108) in a context where free speech interacts with social media 
and all are subjected to the force of the transient present. 
In what has been termed a post-truth and post-trust era (see Harsin, 2015, for a 
formal discussion), statements are made, lies are modified and apologies given, and cynicism 
rules – a cynicism that we don’t have time to answer. Resistance in the form of an assembled 
evidence base takes too long. It might be argued, as Peters (2015) does, that in the political 
field this is nothing new but, as Ferriss (2016) suggests, post-truth seems to be a media - 
especially a social media -, driven strategy. Its relationship to truth is strategic. Its goal is 
the exploitation of emotion in the way that sophism eroded the importance of rhetoric in our 
ways of persuasion. Such political interventions, intent on deceiving the public, are typified 
by the revelation of Arendt (1972). In her article on the systematic lies, deception and self-
deception in the Pentagon during America’s involvement in Indochina, she shows clearly 
how these were used to manipulate public opinion. As Peters suggests, it takes little 
imagination to understand that the notion of facts and evidence in a post-truth era affects 
not only politics and science but ‘becomes a burning issue for education at all levels’ (2017: 
565). Moreover, he suggests that, as education has seemingly undergone a digital turn, 
criticality has been mostly avoided and replaced by narrow conceptions of standards and 
state-mandated instrumental and utilitarian pedagogies. Further, he suggests that this has 
led to a limiting of focus on job training, ‘rather than a broader critical citizenship agenda 
for participatory democracy’ (ibid.). 
This has led to an assimilation of values, not a questioning of them through critical 
reasoning and speaking out against what is morally wrong, dehumanising or self-serving 
about society. Without addressing such issues, any notion of an educated person as one with 
freedom to think and act becomes superficial, leaving scholars and students in a place that 
can lack personal integrity. Moreover, in support of Sockett1 (1989), this seems counter to 
liberal, transformative principles and leaves many universities in a state of self-deception, 
                                                          
1 His opening line of that article is ‘I take education to be a moral business’ (1989: 33). 
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because they are espousing policies and procedures that they are aware undermine what 
they believe, broadly, a liberal education ought to be. Such self-deception comes in many 
forms, each liable to frustrate a productive sense of duty in encounter with either text or 
interlocutors, and thereby ‘inhibiting opportunities to produce meaningful educational ends’ 
(Blenkinsop and Waddington 2014:1511). 
Because of its transformative, rather than economically defined, purpose, neo-liberal 
education is dependent on a trusting relationship between the provider of the educational 
process and the recipient: one does not know what one is expected to receive, as it has to be 
jointly created. In this sense, having trust in the hegemony of state control of education is 
to believe that it will not be used to exploit and manipulate recipients. A relationship of this 
nature between student and academic without enduring evidence of the trustworthiness in 
terms of their authorship, accurate assessment of work, their competence in pedagogical 
practice and in a verifiable command of appropriate knowledge, much like that of authority, 
may be cynically received. This is because it appears to grant power, coercion and control to 
the party in whom trust has been vested. Such an imbalance of power is accepted because 
the powerful in the relationship are experts and students are not; but it is more than that. It 
requires that the lecturers recognise and deliver their obligation of truth-telling within the 
academy. Moreover, it requires students to take a stance on what they can trust in 
themselves; not succumbing to what Furedi (2016) calls the ‘infantilisation’ of higher 
education, but to make existential judgements and assertions based on what they know is 
feasible and likely to be the truth and, from that position, not to fear the lies of a post-trust 
era. 
One of the consequences of the massive changes in contemporary higher education is 
the shift in the power relationship between teachers and students due to the marketisation 
of higher education and the changes in role for institutions to reflect, rather than critically 
to comment, upon society. This has led away from a Socratic questioning of them through 
critical reasoning and speaking out – but this is not new. The essence of Socrates’ Apology to 
the Athenians can be seen today if we take the liberty of substituting the target audience:  
 
[Students and Academics] ‘From the city that is greatest and best reputed for wisdom 
and strength: are you not ashamed that you care for having as much money as 
possible, the reputation, and the honour, but that you neither care for not give 
thought to prudence, and truth, and how your soul will be the best possible?’ Plato 
29d (italics are my addition) 
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There might be an argument here which does not just apply to students but to the lack of 
resistance shown by the various clusters of higher education institutions. It applies to the 
somewhat contradictory nature of embracing the market and its mechanisms at the same 
time as accepting the audit culture of the Research, Teaching and Knowledge Transfer 
framework. This was not offered but imposed upon educational institutions, ostensibly to 
enable greater transparency and accountability but whose functions are more to do with 
control. In the United Kingdom, this can be seen in the confusion and inaccuracies of the 
excellence framework in terms of what they do and what they are meant to measure. This 
has led, although not directly, to the dominance in higher education of the truth that is 
embodied in audit and performance indicators and tables, which of necessity lack informed 
and independent evaluations. Worse still, rather than increasing trust in our sector, these 
metric changes have led to concerns being raised, or at least doubts cast, about the 
trustworthiness of our institutions and the members who constitute them. The model of 
audit does not solve; rather, it displaces trust by shifting it from the object of the trust and 
those who we expect to trust to the new experts, whose skills are in policing and forms of 
documentary evidence of audit. Indeed, as Power has suggested as early as 1994, it might 
destroy ‘the very trust it is meant to address’ (1994:13). Insightful critiques are offered by, 
for instance, Conroy and Smith (2017) of the UK Research Excellence Framework and 
Canning’s (2017) consideration of the teaching excellence framework.  
 
The Veil of Self Deception 
In its extreme, self-deception is the ploy of using a deliberate and irresponsible 
misreading of situations to avoid facing one’s responsibility or the negation of self by others. 
This is both being-with-others and observing them for one’s benefit. It is using others as a 
means to an end or giving up to others that which is central to one’s autonomy: the 
responsibility for one’s actions. What is more, it can readily lead to alienation or self-
estrangement from what one might become, by losing oneself in the dualism of object and 
subject or in the determinism of others. To avoid commitment through which authenticity 
can be realised, the competencies of being-for-others may be used as a sham of security for 
inauthentic relationships and engagements. Those who self-deceive cannot be trusted to tell 
the truth. It is a duty for academics to dispel self-deception both in themselves and in others. 
This manifests itself in the pedagogical practices of critical reasoning which seemed relaxed 
in a context of post-truth and fake news. 
It is a duty, I would claim, that members of the academy are able to recognise in 
their own practice where they are deceiving themselves and, because of it, the contagion 
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that affects others. Moreover, the social contagion of self-deception leads to a state of 
negation of trust in the trustworthy. This is evident in examples of academic and 
managerial practice in the institution. These may include: sticking with favoured theories 
rather than seeking evidence that might contest them; attributing more effort to one’s 
contribution to an article than is fair; interrupting government policy in a way that is in 
one’s own self-interest rather than the institution’s; allowing unintended grade inflation to 
enhance student satisfaction; and allowing one’s own ideological perspective to construe the 
needs of students.  
Deception and self-deception may also be identified in the contextualising of 
instructional policy and practice of higher education. They can be seen in how education has 
drifted from being an end in itself towards a supply economics imperative or where scholars 
seek favourable student evaluations rather than stretching students’ capabilities, fuelled by 
emotional labour and creating personal brands. Although such practices seem counter to 
principles of liberal, transformative education, they present a dilemma. Should we facilitate 
students and staff to speak the truth to each other, when this might not be in their best 
interests in a world that encourages compliance rather than free thinking, a world where we 
are under constant surveillance and are often herded by the industrial and commercial 
global powers? How, morally, should we prepare them to help them to flourish? A response 
is truth telling in ways that care but do not mislead students into believing they have 
mastery of what they do not: to coach mediocrity as merit. Such truth telling risks 
retribution due to higher failure rates, more students discontinuing and less lavish final 
credentials. But perhaps that is fair in the long run and will enable students to be more 
trustworthy and aware of their attributes?  
Students too might exhibit bad faith in the way in which they protect themselves from the 
transformative opportunities of the university: over confidence hiding anxiety; playing the 
culture of student as consumer; abdicating responsibility for the self by shifting blame to a 
higher authority. Students appear to lack self-insight, “inhibiting authenticity and actively 
limiting one’s ability to enter into genuine relationships with others’ (Blenkinsop and 
Waddington (2014:1512).  This is resolvable through self-trust which is a counter to such 
deception. 
Self-trust is the basis of independently and critically knowing one's world and being 
in that world. Lehrer encapsulates this as being able to 'consider myself worthy of trust in 
what I accept and prefer’ (1997: 5), and what makes me worthy of my trust in my capacity to 
evaluate my beliefs and desires. As Lehrer continues, our ability to make judgements about 
the trustworthiness of others ‘may result in a change in what I accept and prefer, and that 
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change can make me more trustworthy for myself and others’ (ibid.: 127). Such 
trustworthiness is implied in the notion of academic freedom and free speech; it is 
something that academics should exhibit and students should learn in the acquisition of 
higher education. It is, indeed, embedded in the level descriptors that signify what higher 
education is. 
 
Obligations before Rights  
Among the things that we can do to help students is to tell them the truth of what 
they have been offered for their futures. This role is a duty, of academics, I believe, to 
transcend their disciplines in preparing students for a world in which their contribution is 
significant and worthy. Indeed, these duties of truth-telling, as Weil (1953) has advocated in 
the first line of her book, The Need for Roots, ‘come before that of rights, which is 
subordinate and relative to the former’ (1953: 3). This is not to assume all those that have 
rights have obligations but that there is, in unexceptional circumstances, a direct 
relationship in which duties should precede rights, especially in higher education with the 
privileges it provides and bestows, upon students and academics. These duties explored by 
Weil (ibid.: 36-39) include truth and the obligations of the truth-teller. If accepted, this 
might require us to consider a reorientation of the notion of the rights-based contemporary 
university (O’Neill, 2002). This seems to have roots in the Socratic notion of the harmony of 
truth-telling and behaviour, as revealed in Plato’s Laches as care for the soul: a caring for the 
morality of oneself through knowing, trusting and being the stance that one takes for 
oneself. This requires a sense of courage to grasp freedom to be for oneself amongst others 
and, as universities become more managerial, extended and digital, they are less conducive 
to such freedoms.  
The neo-liberal context in which higher education institutions act tends to prioritise 
rights over obligations: the right of students enshrined in customer contracts where 
students are treated manifestly as consumers, imbued with a certain sovereignty. As O’Neill 
suggests, if ‘we take rights seriously and see them as normative rather than aspirational, we 
must take obligations seriously’  (2005:430). I am suggesting that we have obligations 
which go beyond those embedded under current law where universities have a duty to 
protect free speech and equality but even here judgement is needed, for, as the Grant Report 
(2011) on Freedom of Speech states,  ‘there are circumstances when universities must map 
out a way forward between contradictory positions’ (2011:7). It is within the flux of legal 
duties and political pressures which often seem more aspirational than normative that we 
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must trust our academics to serve the interests of truth. It is one of the things which ought 
to set universities apart from other institutions. 
Indeed, Williams argues that the ‘authority of academics must be rooted in their 
truthfulness in two respects: they take care in what they say, and they are sincere in what 
they say’ (2002: 11). This is because sincerity is not rule-constrained but is a form of trust 
that avoids actions that manipulate and dominate others. The disposition itself enables the 
agent to think clearly and without self-deceit about the occasions when deceit is required, 
and to keep a sense of those when something is lost by it (Williams, 2002: 121). 
This disposition, as Williams (2002) proclaims, is based on our assertions being both 
accurate and sincere. Moreover, such truthfulness is in the word, intentions and actions of 
the one who is deemed trustworthy. It is a value-laden notion that transcends mere 
instructional contractualism and word games of deception; it is about being intrinsically 
comfortable with one’s truthfulness in one’s assertions and the implications that may 
reasonably be assumed to follow such assertions. It is not about self-interest. 
Yet at any time, but especially in our current epoch of complexity, as O’Neill (2002b: 
6) points out, it might be wrong to expect that trust can ‘require a watertight guarantee of 
others’ performance’, and what we can expect is that certain standards and obligations will 
be maintained. One of these should be that a duty of truth-telling is placed on academics to 
educate and potentially transform gullible others into those who can make judgements 
based on worthy and reliable notions from their own self-trust. 
I do recognise that a criticism of this position might be that it is a lingering, 
nostalgic yearning for a sector that once had values that better suited the self-accountable, 
autonomous academic. Such nostalgia for a time gone by misses the important change in 
opening up the opportunities of higher education to the many, and often neglects to 
confront the privileges conferred upon the few, academics and students, whose very 
participation was likely to have been based on the social class from which they emerged. 
The massification of higher education might well be at odds with the notion of Humboldtian 
Bildung and Newman’s liberal education, but they were of a different epoch and context. It 
may be fair to argue that to act as if the conventions of those days still pertain is self-
deceiving.  
 
What can the higher education institution do? 
Teaching in higher education also carries privileges and associated obligations: ‘If 
we can clarify our perception of duty and gain public acceptance of it, we will have fulfilled 
an important obligation to the society that nurtures us. These obligations constitute the 
8 
highest institutional form of academic duty’ (Kennedy, 1997: 22). These are the closing 
sentences in the first chapter of Kennedy’s Academic Duty. By placing duty central to the 
notion of academics in higher education institutions, Kennedy identifies a moral 
responsibility for academics that offers a way of establishing the trust that was shared 
between the university sector and the general public. Duty in the existential sense is not, 
however, the Kantian imperative of following given universals (although we might choose 
to act as if they did), nor the liberal balance of rights, but is an accountability to oneself to 
have the courage and skill to interpret one’s individuality within our world as a dialectic 
between oneself and humanity. In this, it is an ethical exercise and is built through trust as 
an implicit obligation – voluntarily accepted, in the case of an academic – to pursue worthy 
activities and not the mechanisms of competencies.  
As O’Neill (2013) proposes, we need ways to distinguish trustworthy from 
untrustworthy informants. Moreover, if society trusts what universities say about how they 
can facilitate choice and opportunities for a student’s future, our appointment to the 
academy should signal that. Examples abound. From embracing league tables when it suits 
and critically objecting to them when it doesn’t; arguing for a social mobility that is not 
evident (Social Mobility and Child Poverty Commission, 2012; Bowl, McCaig and 
Hughes,2018) rather than seeking social justice (Brown, 2017); lending academic authority 
to populist propaganda in terms of marketing (Advertising Standards Authority, 2017) and 
claiming that earning benefits will be enjoyed by all from being awarded a degree 
(Department of Education, LEO, 2017) do nothing to build confidence in the university as a 
site of truth-tellers. As revelation of these deceptions leads to loss of trust in the 
trustworthy and a construction of reality, higher education’s authority as a source of truth is 
questioned. These deceptions may be hidden in the pretext of a university education that is 
value for money for the majority of students (although the 2017 National Student Survey 
results seem to show this is now being questioned), rather than as a social mechanism to 
manage an increase in age-group demographics.  
The issue for scholars then is that they can think correctly and that they enable their 
students to strive to do the same. Opinion has to be set aside for an obligation to enable the 
freedom to search for truth and this requires an obligation to take responsibility for one’s 
ideas. As Rider so elegantly puts it, the “desire to think freely entails that one also desires to 
think rightly, not for conceptual or psychological reasons, but for moral ones’ (2018:39). 
This requires courage and, if the university is to be other than an instrument of the agendas 
of the political and economic, we need to take seriously our duty to actively develop 
communities of truth seeking and truth telling in ways that can be trusted. To confront 
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post-trust, an academic should not be an apologist for those who speak of their power rather 
than to it. In this sense, I am reminded of Foucault’s Paris lectures (2010) on parrhesia, of 
speaking to the truth and of Peters’ (2003) discussion of truth-telling as an educational 
practice. To speak out when the consequences may be unfavourable to oneself requires 
courage and a reconstitution of what higher education has become. This is a return to an 
ethos of personal growth that better represents what humanity might become, rather than 
offering a service of blinkered higher skills training. Moreover, it requires the teacher to be 
trustworthy and veritistic, to show by example what a search for answers looks like. It 
requires a form of self-trust that can avoid the deception of society and of oneself; a 
deception that was prevalent even before a post-trust era, yet which is more acute and 
acceptable within it. If this is taken as an inherent duty of an academic it might enhance our 
credibility as moral and epistemic agents rather than show time experts for the media. 
A comprehensive discussion of the duty of trust within the confines of academic 
teaching practices is provided by Curzon-Hobson (2002)2. He argues that trust is a 
fundamental element in the pursuit of higher learning, for it is only through a sense of trust 
that students embrace an empowering experience of freedom, and the exercise of this 
freedom requires students and their teachers to take a risk: 
 
It challenges students to think and act according to their own perceptions without 
recourse to recitation or transcending ideals. This sense of freedom and the 
experience of risk is that which underpins students’ projections to realise their 
unique potentiality. It requires a sensation of trust that is different from that which 
forms the basis of prescriptive accountability mechanisms and is, in fact, 
marginalised by such practices. (Curzon-Hobson, 2002: 226)  
 
Reflection, evaluation and monitoring are acts of autonomous thinkers of the type 
that liberal education, and indeed industry, claim to want. These reflective practices also 
contribute to self-belief, knowledge and truth which differentiate the self from others. To 
trust in one's own ability to make decisions on one's own preference is central to liberal 
ideals of autonomous, free action. To be able to accept the responsibility that this implies, of 
constituting a reasoned world reality, facilitates the ontological integration of self. It 
encourages creativity, confidence and community through the negotiation of shared realities. 
                                                          
2 I focus on teaching as an example but much the same applies in research where an obligation of truth 
precedes the right for research findings to be taken seriously. 
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In building this reasoned network of preference and acceptances of 'truth', in the 
sense of everyday-ness of action, students should reveal themselves both as self-trusting and 
as trustworthy people. To reach that position, they must be able to distinguish between 
their justified confidence in their competence in certain arenas and where they are 
incompetent. Students are likely to retain their self-trust only while that which they hold as 
trustworthy maintains its social validity; they are able to argue rationally for what they 
hold to be true or to assimilate into what their community holds as truth. This revelation 
process is interpreted by Tierney (2006) as a ‘grammar of trust’ which has requirements and 
obligations on its users.  
Higher education should therefore encourage self-trust developed through reasoned 
argument, debate and freedom of thought and a recognition of the obligations that accrue to 
such freedom. For students to be prepared to risk the socially constructed self to a process 
of authentic discovery of truth demands mutual and empathetic trust. Students need to trust 
that if they stray too far from the commonality of experience they will not be expelled or 
vilified as eccentrics or charlatans. This leads to sincerity and empathy, which can manifest 
itself in the praxis of critical being (Barnett, 1997). The recognition of the existence of the 
potential for such mutuality is held in the collective goodwill of all stakeholders of the 
institution and is (or, perhaps, ought to be) the basis of public trust in higher education 
institutions. 
Academics have a dependency relationship with students that requires a duty of 
sincerity from the academic to avoid the potential for exploitation of the vulnerabilities of 
both student and of the academic herself. In relation to the discipline, academics are trusted 
by their peers to share common goals that include: responsible conduct in research and 
authorship practices, no form of harassment and the avoidance of conflict of interest. These 
erode the fabric of trust on which worthwhile social interactions are constructed. A test of a 
profession's trust may take place when one of its number contravenes these principles. Is a 
sanction dependent on incompetence, assuming moral good intent, or is it based on the 
competence of deceit: being caught?  
To re-establish such a duty both epistemologically and ontologically, if indeed it has 
really been missing rather than hidden, will not be a quick fix in this environment of 
managerialism now fostered by post-truth and -trust. It might require a fundamental 
commitment to a duty of truth-telling in those charged with the revelation of the 
potentialities of those who offer themselves to the pursuit of higher education and on whom 
much of our civic flourishing may depend.  
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Concluding remarks – a duty of trust as the foundation of higher education 
This article has sought to confirm the duty of trustworthiness in our academics at a time of 
post-truth and fake news, in what Peters has called ‘viral modernity’ (2018). This is an 
evolution which serves to encourage deceit, lies and uncertainty and I have suggested that 
higher education has not been exempt from its influence. A duty of trust owed by academics 
to students and their communities has been considered as a virtue of 'good' higher education. 
It has allowed opportunities for one to question the importance of self and one’s 
contribution to society, and this might well help to settle the purpose of higher education. 
Certainly, in an educational framework where the self has to expose its vulnerability to 
others, anything other than a moral duty of trusting care would make the offer of education 
potentially loaded and exploitative. Indeed, I follow Olafson (1998) in that a failure to 
respect others is a violation of the trust placed in us, as academics, by those to whom we are 
responsible. But this trust is eroding and what I am advocating is a need to reassert the 
spirit of duty; especially that of truth telling. 
The most important question for the future of higher education seems to be 'can we 
trust those who control it to deliver anything other than competencies aimed at securing 
employment and the fluidity in what is taken as truth?’. ‘Value’ falls to the level of the 
market and the freedom to explore is constrained by expediency. A competence model of 
education has benefits for those who feel attracted to this economic expediency model. 
However, the appropriateness of such business comparisons for higher education is 
debatable and, even if valid, changes not only the process of becoming but the very nature of 
the autonomous individual.  
I suggest that a failure of academics to speak out against the institutional bad faith in 
our engagements with students within the institutions in which we work and, for them, 
likewise not to speak out to policy, can easily result in the objectification of the other for 
both students and educator, inhibiting opportunities to produce meaningful educational 
ends. The issue has to be addressed through an assessment of what we expect from the 
university: quite simply, in whom can we trust? 
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